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Abstract 
Since 2008, catastrophic losses and financial turmoil have deeply shaken the insurance and 
reinsurance industries. Severe difficulties encountered by sector leaders like AIG and Swiss Re have 
shed light on the potential fragility of the players, and have increased attention on the subject of 
reinsurance counterparty risk.  This corresponds to the exposure of an insurance company to reinsurer 
failure and is difficult to assess due to a scarcity of reliable measures. It has long been considered as 
largely auto-regulated by the insurance market.  The impact of reinsurance credit on an insurers’ 
balance sheet, market complexity and lack of coordinated responses among states begs questions 
concerning the role of control and regulation. In this article, we address the current state of 
reinsurance counterparty risk and existing means by which to measure it. We then discuss the impact 
of market discipline on this risk and point out the importance of control within the reinsurance industry.  
We particularly look at the key role of regulation in providing better risk measurement tools to assist in 
assessing the importance of reinsurance counterparty risk on insurance levels and the systematic 
development of risk management tools. 
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Introduction 
 
Even if insurance and reinsurance companies remained stable after the catastrophic losses, stock 
market volatility and decline in investment yields in 2010 and 2011, the 2008 financial crisis shed new 
light on the question of risk measurement and transfer in financial markets. The insurance industry has 
been deeply shaken, essentially on the asset side of its activity, as a result of events like the fall of 
AIG, the downgrade of Swiss Re and the resulting impact on means of alternative risk transfer.  The 
question of insurance company exposure to reinsurance counterparty risk remains an important issue 
in insurance firm risk management.   
 
In this article, we analyze the importance of default risk in light of recent events and discuss ways to 
mitigate it. Section 1 presents the state of the market and defines risk linked to reinsurer default. 
Section 2 explores current means of measuring counterparty risk, and highlights critical underlying 
issues. Section 3 discusses insurance industry market discipline concerning reinsurance counterparty 
risk. Finally, section 4 analyses current regulation solutions.   
 
1. A market with growing exposure to reinsurance default risk 
 
The reinsurance industry has greatly evolved over the last fifteen years.  In 2007, some 150 
reinsurance companies received a total premium volume of roughly $200 billion (Standard and Poor's, 
2011) and had a total capitalization estimated at $129 billion for the last quarter of 2007 (Benfield 
Group, 2008). Historically, the reinsurance market has been dominated by specialized reinsurance 
companies, concentrated mostly in Europe and Bermuda and has been very intertwined on a 
worldwide level.  Because transactions are primarily over the counter, information is scarce and 
difficult to obtain. Since the beginning of the nineties, reinsurance companies have become more 
intertwined. From 2003 to 2009, the market share of the ten first reinsurers (both Life and non-Life) 
rose from 56% to 65% (Global Reinsurance Highlights report of Standard and Poor's, 2011). Details of 
this phenomenon for the top 5 reinsurers are given in Table (1). Guy Carpenter cited 59 M & A 
transactions in 2008 accounting for an aggregate value of $16.6 billion.  
 
Simultaneously, the past ten years have seen the downgrading of reinsurance companies as 
illustrated in Figure (1).  This may be explained by a variety of factors: the cost of some particular 
events for the industry (Andrew, 9/11, Katrina), reserve strengthening for non-life reinsurers, purchase 
of certain reinsurers at inflated prices or under-performing equity markets. From this perspective, 2011 
was particularly turbulent for insurance markets and was characterized by catastrophes that implied 
losses similar to those the reinsurance market sustained from U.S. hurricanes in 2004 and 2005. 
According to Aon - Benfield Group (2012), global property catastrophe losses for 2011 were estimated 
at $434 billion. In addition, financial markets in 2011 were impacted by volatile stock market 
conditions, record low investment yields, downgrade of U.S. debt and the European sovereign debt 
crisis.  Fortunately, most carriers avoided direct hits because of strong capital positions held for 3 or 4 
years. Nevertheless, for the future, external capital is likely to remain difficult and costly to acquire, and 
constraints on capital markets will force the industry to reconsider how to transfer it. For example, in 
2011, outstanding catastrophe bond issuances were equal to $4.6 billion, below the level in 2006. In 
2008 and 2009, among the various reinsurers in the market, Swiss Re was strongly weakened by its 
financial activities, rendering Berkshire Hathaway's capital injection necessary as well as the purchase 
of an insurance cover. On the contrary, Munich Re conserved its rating whereas Berkshire Hathaway, 
following some financial losses due to its banking activity, was downgraded by two rating agencies.  
 
Table (2) details the claim amounts due but not paid to the cedent by the reinsurance company for 
certain countries. The weight of balance sheet reinsurance recoverables on insurance companies, as 
well as on reinsurance market structure, point out the importance of studying reinsurance counterparty 
risk. According to the UK's Financial Services Authority definition, a credit risk is incurred whenever a 
firm is exposed to loss if a counterparty fails to perform its contractual obligations, including failure to 
perform in a timely manner. More precisely, a credit event may be classically defined as the failure for 
an issuer to pay a coupon or to redeem the principal value of an obligation on maturity date; it may 
also include filing for bankruptcy, insolvency, or compulsory restructuring (Swiss Re, 2003). Reinsurer 
bankruptcy may spring from three areas: risk subscription and investment policy as classically 
experienced by all insurance companies, retrocession, and risk credit exposure. Historically, there 
have been very few reinsurer bankruptcies: between 1980 and 2003, only 24 were enumerated by 
(Swiss Re, 2003) for a total gross premium corresponding to $820 million (see Figure (2)). In fact, 
many bankruptcies are avoided by the fact that reinsurance companies put their investments into run-
off before becoming insolvent.  
 
In case of reinsurer default, an insurance company faces higher financial charges and difficulty 
reimbursing its insured clients in case of high claims. Few studies have focused on the way insurance 
companies take into account reinsurer credit risk. The question has been raised when considering 
optimal reinsurance contracts (Gajek and Zagrodny, 2004) for examining existing or changing 
regulations (Rossi and Lowe, 2002) and particularly in the case of the United States (Cole and 
McCullough, 2006; Cole et al., 2007). A liquid market for reinsurance claims does not exist and thus 
creditors are not allowed to modify their position depending on the credit risk of their reinsurers. This 
exposure may weaken the creditworthiness of one insurer, as was the case for Reliance Group 
Holdings: this US-based group collapsed when its exposure to reinsurance recoverables reached 
600% of consolidated surplus at a time when no liquid assets were available and sub-investment 
grade debt was due for repayment (Benfield Group, 2007). 
 
Global exposure of insurance companies to reinsurance credit risk may also weaken the industry as a 
whole, given its intertwined nature. Systemic risk (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000) exists at industry or 
at economy levels. Van Lelyveld et al. (2009) estimate that among the risks introduced by use of 
reinsurance, credit risk is the single failure most likely to threaten financial stability of the concentrated 
reinsurance market and could induce large losses. Furthermore, retrocessions may increase the 
phenomena, as the London XL Spiral proved in the nineties. Burkart (2006) and Wade (2008) highlight 
that a chain of retrocessions built during the eighties weakened the industry, funneling underlying 
losses through a chain of Lloyd's syndicates, rendering them opaque and difficult to price. When the 
catastrophes occurred, losses were on a scale that threatened the whole industry. In 2005, the 
retrocession rate of reinsurance companies was estimated at 15% of ceded premiums (Group of 
Thirty, 2006). The limited number of reinsurers and their weaknesses to the same extreme shocks (on 
assets or liabilities) limited the likelihood that they could be responsible for a global systemic risk, but 
they were capable of weakening the insurance industry, esteemed the Group of Thirty (2006). The 
prospective study from Van Lelyveld et al. (2009) on the Dutch reinsurance market provides no 
evidence of reinsurance systemic risk. Nevertheless, the 2008 financial turmoil began by the failure of 
major financial firms and was characterized by a strong decrease of transactions in the market, 
requiring state intervention. This did not create a real systemic risk, but the consequences of financial 
firm bankruptcy on the situation cannot be ignored. 
 
2. The difficulty of quantifying and estimating counterparty risk 
 
Before monitoring reinsurance counterparty risk, one must have knowledge of such a risk. The 
modeling of default risk poses a number of challenges, especially in terms of information access. The 
reinsurance market is quite opaque, information on reinsurance company financial health being 
available mainly through rating agency notation. Extracting such information from financial markets 
remains difficult, as Burkart (2006) showed in his study of co-movements of default risk in the 
reinsurance industry. Issues related to estimating and modeling are as follows: 
 
• Default probability: The probabilities of default within the market cannot be directly observed 
but need to be calculated based on either historical credit rating experience, deduced from a 
process involving certain forms of market prices, determined using a model of the underlying 
risk sources, or drawn from subjective credit assessment criteria.  
  
• Default correlation: Directly modeling default correlation is challenging.  This is due to the 
non-triviality of attempting to simulate correlated binary variables or to a lack of credible 
historical data for estimating default correlation directly. Flower et al. (2007) point out several 
sources of correlation to be taken into account when modeling the consequences of 
reinsurance default risk on a primary insurer's balance sheet. Shocks are the first source of 
correlation because reinsurers are broadly subject to common risks. Similarly, correlations 
between underwriting years introduce some temporal effects. Furthermore, the market is 
subject to wide cycle effects, in the sense that sustained soft cycle periods lead to growing 
reserve issues which can subsequently emerge as credit issues. This type of correlation is 
enhanced by the intertwined structure of the market: primary insurers and reinsurers are 
affected by the same types of events; domino effects may appear as a result of the different 
levels of retrocession. 
Additionally, capital requirement calculations at the extreme loss percentiles involve 
examination of the tails of asymmetric fat-tailed loss distributions. Is it particularly true for 
dependency issues that are difficult to capture for fat-tailed insurance risk distributions. 
Unfortunately, tools like copulae may appear irrelevant because of the limited available data 
which induce a high volatility when estimating them. 
 
• Recovery rate: The main issue for its assessment is the difficulty to close an operation. As 
explained by Standard and Poor's (2008b), “an insurer may cease to write new risk but could 
spend years, sometimes decades, settling the liabilities that arise from the policies written 
before it closed its doors.” In case of run-off, the entity may have difficulty raising capital. That 
explains why S&P has developed run-off payment assessment which measures the capacity 
of an insurance company to pay its policies. 
  
• Time horizon: all of these issues are reinforced by the long-term relationships between 
insurance and reinsurance companies. Indeed, the duration of insurance liabilities – and thus 
of reinsurance claims – covers many years. On the contrary, the measure of the underlying 
risks to the reinsurance credit risk, mainly catastrophic and financial risks, is generally limited 
to a short horizon. 
 
Methodologies which aim at modeling reinsurance default risk take into account, more or less, the 
various issues. One of the first approaches proposed was cited by the “Bad Debt Paper'” (Bulmer et 
al., 2000) and adopted as a US actuary Advisory Note. It promotes factor-based deterministic 
provisions. The counterparty risk is captured through charge factors applied to expected recoveries. 
But, with the development of ICAS, Solvency II and Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), economic 
capital modeling has adopted a more prospective view. The various solutions for modeling reinsurance 
counterparty risk are detailed in Figure (3). We distinguish between two types of model. The first relies 
on a financial model of credit risk, as promoted by Flower et al. (2007) and by Sachs (2007), where 
one is confronted with the difficulty of dealing with reinsurance credit risk portfolios that are much less 
diversified than typical banking credit portfolios. The second type is based on actuarial foundations 
and models shocks on the reinsurance market at a high level, as in Grinda and Nguyen (2006), or in a 
more schematic way in Ter Berg (2008). 
 
Recent development of several models illustrates the fact that assessment of reinsurance counterparty 
risk is a difficult task and that work is in progress, upheld and moved ahead by the necessity for 
monitoring risk. 
 
3. The market discipline for reinsurance default risk 
 
Considering the recent impacts of the financial crisis, as well as past crises, the question of the need 
to regulate reinsurance counterparty risk must be addressed. As Harrington (2005) describes, the 
rationale for government intervention must respond to the following considerations (introduced by 
Breyer (1982)): the potential for market failure in a competitive market must be assessed and there 
must be positive benefits to regulation. Thus a preamble to the question of regulation is the study of 
market discipline on reinsurance counterparty risk.  This involves, on one hand, reinsurers' capability 
to monitor their solvency risk, and on the other hand, the capacity of insurance companies to self-
monitor their exposure to reinsurance counterparty risk.  
 
As regards the reinsurance industry, Epermanis and Harrington (2006) point out several features of 
the market that plead for a certain level of discipline. Standard agency considerations as well as 
litigation costs provide incentives for reinsurers to limit their default risk. In addition, as highlighted by 
Jean-Baptiste and Santomero (2000), the reinsurance market is characterized by long-term 
relationships between insurers and reinsurers. Moreover, transactions take place between two well-
informed players. Rossi and Lowe (2002) insist on the differences between the insurance and 
reinsurance industries, arguing that insurance companies are more capable of evaluating reinsurers’ 
products than are customers when faced with evaluating insurers’ products. Thus, in markets based 
on trust, as in the financial services industry, reinsurer self-discipline is all the more necessary 
because they exercise a business-to-business activity. For example, several studies have shown the 
impact of quality on reinsurance treaties regulating pricing and contracting.  Zanjani (2002) considers a 
theoretical model where risk neutral reinsurers with limited liability face a demand for insurance 
conditional on quality that explains their choice of a level of internal capital limiting default risk. 
Furthermore, econometric studies have shown that there exists a slight premium for credit risk. Weiss 
and Chung’s (2004) results support the risky debt hypothesis that consumers are concerned with the 
financial strength of reinsurers, as demonstrated by policyholders’ surplus, past profit or loss on 
ordinary activities and new capital all of which are related to reinsurance prices.  
 
As for the exposure of insurance companies to reinsurance counterparty risk, the same standard 
arguments may apply to reinsurance companies concerning self-regulation: agency consideration, 
protection of the franchise value, debt holder monitoring risk management, and consumer demand for 
long-term relationships with insurers, all provide incentives to insurance companies to monitor their 
own default risk and in doing so, their reinsurance coverage and the inherent counterparty risk.  The 
empirical study of Epermanis and Harrington (2006) documents that rating downgrades of U.S non-life 
insurance companies are followed by revenue declines in comparison with insurers that did not 
experience rating downgrades3. This highlights the importance of insurer financial strength. The rise of 
risk management over the last ten years has lead to the development of techniques that may be used 
to mitigate this counterparty risk. Table (3) synthesizes them.  Classical tools include those usually 
used for the monitoring of reinsurance coverage. Diversification of reinsurance companies as a means 
used to cover risk allows mitigating counterparty risk. Self-retention management, often used in a cost 
reduction perspective, may also address the issue. On one hand, higher retention increases the 
                                                          
3
  Note that there is also a rational for risk-loving behaviors, particularly when companies face high insolvency risk in a system 
where there is a guaranty fund. Bohn and Hall (1999) provide evidence of high premium growth for more than one third of US 
P&C insurance companies in the two years before their failures. 
capital requirement due to non-transferred risk, and thus the corresponding cost of capital, but reduces 
the ceded premiums; on the other hand it increases the capital requirement due to reinsurance 
counterparty risks and the corresponding cost of capital, but it also increases the ceded premiums. 
This arbitrage between expected profit and certainty equivalent raises a central question for firms 
concerning their risk appetite. Obviously, with growing interest for risk management having been 
identified by the Benfield Group (2008), knowledge of reinsurance counterparty risk is also taken into 
consideration.  
 
Following Plantin (2006), a size-based distinction has to be made between insurance companies. 
Reinsurance companies do not merely offer external capital to cover extreme risk, they also provide 
risk expertise to their customers.  In the case of relatively small companies, reinsurers are unavoidable 
partners for risk management. Therefore, since medium or large companies have begun to develop 
real risk management expertise, they no longer rely as heavily on reinsurance company knowledge. 
New tools have also been tried to mitigate reinsurance default risk.  
 
Development of the catastrophe bonds market represented a way to diversify catastrophe coverage 
without being subject to reinsurance default risk. However, default risk on catastrophe bonds is not 
zero: it is subject to the counterparty risk of the swap, as illustrated by the consequences of the 
Lehman Brothers downfall which caused the default of four catastrophe bonds in 2008. With the 
development of financial instruments to cover credit risk, direct coverage tools have been available for 
insurers: insurers or reinsurers have been using Credit Default Swaps for some time (Sawyer, 2006). 
Yet not all insurers use them, some arguing that the markets are still too young. More sophisticated 
products have even been structured to allow for hedging a portfolio of credit risks. In 2007, Hannover 
Re issued a CDO of reinsurance recoverables.  However, the credit crisis has demonstrated the 
difficulty in pricing and structuring this kind of product, a difficulty enhanced when considering a tail 
risk such as reinsurance default risk. Furthermore, due to its complexity, the cost of such coverage 
would be relatively high compared to the expected loss from reinsurer default. 
 
Furthermore reinsurance counterparty risk remains a rare risk that only large insurance companies 
seem to have the luxury to study. Section 3 showed that measuring reinsurance counterparty risk is 
delicate, mostly due to imperfect information on the dependency between actors, between long tail 
risks, and between insurance and financial risks. This limited knowledge of risk handicaps 
development of an efficient market discipline. Regulation, however, allows partially solving this issue 
and is necessary to reveal it. 
 
4. The modalities and rules of regulation 
 
Reinsurance insurance has always been an opaque market and its culture relies on trust built between 
cedents and their reinsurers in the framework of a long-term relationship.  Since the early 1990s, many 
changes have occurred in the market. It has become increasingly intertwined due to market 
concentration.  There are a few main actors in a very global field. The underlying risks have also 
evolved, as market locations have changed with the birth of the Bermudians.  Furthermore, 
management styles have evolved, with the more traditional saxon model giving way to the anglo-
saxon one, as highlighted by Albert (1991). In this context, the recent financial crisis has pointed out 
the need to reconsider reinsurance default risk regulation, particularly when reinsurance giants like 
Swiss Re have been shaken by recent events.  
 
Revealing information on reinsurance counterparty risk seems central to answering regulation 
questions, as reliable information concerning market discipline is necessary.  There is thus a real 
place for regulators in developing better risk understanding, through increased information sharing 
within reinsurance markets. Until now, part of this information has been provided by rating agencies.  
The Group of Thirty (2006) characterizes these agencies as de-facto-regulators. Although their 
estimation of reinsurance counterparty risk remains very limited, it should not be taken for granted. 
Global questioning of their role in the current crisis seems relevant when considering precisely this 
case. There are three different levels of regulator action that have been taken in different countries. 
These actions respond unequally to the question of information disclosure.  Table (4) provides a 
summary of the different observed means of regulation and their benefits and drawbacks.  
 
The first possibility is direct regulation at the reinsurance market level. Such regulation is not always 
advocated, as noted by Harrington (2005) who estimates that as the reinsurance industry has greater 
self-discipline than either the insurance or banking industries, solvency and capital requirements 
should be consequently less restrictive. Evolution of this discussion is noticeable at several levels. In 
the European Union, Solvability II includes capital requirements for reinsurance counterparty risk. 
Furthermore the Reinsurance Directive, adopted in 2005, implemented a common regulatory system 
which particularly aims at incorporating reinsurance into the EU's supervisory system of the insurance 
industry (Evans, 2007). 
A second possibility is to regulate contracts between insurers and their reinsurers. This is 
predominantly the case for reinsurance companies originating from countries outside the jurisdiction of 
the cedant. It stems from a desire to fully protect the cedant, and thus the final consumers, from the 
reinsurance counterparty risk when not being controlled by the same authority. Discussions are 
underway in the US on collateralization requirements for unauthorized reinsurance companies4 that 
have the obligation to fully collateralize gross US liabilities.  
Finally, regulation concerning the level of insurance is possible, obliging insurers to immobilize capital 
corresponding to the risk and to their management possibilities. Regulators may have an interesting 
catalyst role when creating new measures for risk, as is the case in the European Union, with the SCR 
calculation. Such measures can augment insurance company interest in risk monitoring. It develops 
research for new tools and methodologies, and eventually leads to the disclosure of more information 
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 According to Guy Carpenter's website, we can define authorized reinsurance as the reinsurance placed with a reinsurer which 
is licensed or otherwise recognized by a particular state insurance department. We call an insurer or reinsurer domiciled outside 
the U.S. but conducting an insurance or reinsurance business within the U.S., an Alien Company.  
by reinsurers concerning their default risk. Even if large insurance companies are already relatively 
autonomous in their risk management, it can be particularly useful for small insurance companies. 
 
Notwithstanding the different possible means of regulation, some key questions must be addressed 
when opting for regulation. First, the cost of regulating should be carefully considered. Some 
companies like Swiss Re (2003), or researchers like Arnold (2008), argue that regulation may limit 
capacity: it is explicit for strong alien reinsurers whose capacity could be of use, if the capital 
requirement increases to provide protection. Moreover, the market does not seem to value solvency 
protection. Cole et al. (2007) point out the absence of a relation between use of unauthorized 
reinsurance and prices. In any case, intensively regulating reinsurance insolvency risk implies 
additional costs (Harrington, 2005), among them an increase of the cost of reinsurance. Strict 
reinsurance regulation implies higher costs of reinsurance, and capital immobilization at the insurer 
level to take into account reinsurance counterparty risk is costly as well. All these costs are ultimately 
passed on to the insured parties. Advocating regulation of this risk implicitly recognizes the role of the 
reinsurance industry in spreading global risk.   
 
The question of reinsurance counterparty risk can indeed be addressed in a more global regulation 
question. This includes the degree to which insurance companies should be protected from 
reinsurance counterparty risk, as well as the degree to which reinsurance regulation should allow the 
disappearance of not sufficiently sound insurers or reinsurers in case of crisis.  Global harmony in 
regulation could be beneficial for the reinsurance industry, due to their business model that rests on 
the widest possible diversification and distribution of risk. Rossi and Lowe (2002) point out that there is 
no central regulation of the reinsurance industry: it differs from one country to another, and mutual 
recognition is uncommon. As analyzed by Alexander et al. (2006), the IAIS has certainly promoted 
some basic standards for reinsurance supervision by encouraging coordination between national 
regulators, but they have not been introduced by all countries. The Group of Thirty (2006) and Evans 
(2007) highlight the importance of reinsurance for the financial stability of the insurance industry. They 
underscore the advantages of regulation at a regional level, at least to ease risk transfers. Going 
further, Vogelgesang and Kubicek (2007) advocate global supervision of reinsurance companies: 
reinsurer eligibility to conduct business should be determined by a single body and monitored  
frequently .  Furthermore, national supervision regimes should be compatible. The role of supervisors 
to pay attention to signs indicating need for intervention also remains important. In the case of the 
insurance industry, Bohn and Hall (1999) exploit pre-insolvency data to detect premium patterns 
before insolvency; they find evidence that a large percentage of firms grow quickly before failure.  
 
An alternative to direct regulation would be increased market discipline (Harrington, 2005), 
encouraging stakeholders to pay more attention to default risk. Regulation at the European level deals 
with this issue in two ways, first by obliging insurers to assess the capital charge relative to reinsurer 
default risk (to this end, Solvency II eases transparency and allows the development of standards). 
Second, being characterized by a capital charge, each reinsurer is encouraged to control its financial 
strength. At the market level, such regulation is more able to improve market discipline than use of 
collaterals which do not make reinsurers aware of their responsibilities – the collateral amount 
depends roughly on financial health – and directly limits access to the market.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Trust is the basis for insurance and reinsurance industry interactions. Considering the weight of 
reinsurance recoverables on insurer balance sheets, the increase of insurance risks, and the turmoil in 
financial markets - particularly related to risk transfers - reinsurance counterparty risk has to be 
carefully monitored. Market discipline, existant due to the particularities of the market, is not, however, 
sufficient to monitor this tail risk.  
In this context, a certainty remains. Insurance companies have to develop strong expertise concerning 
their own risks to be able to decide which risks they are not able to support and thus determine their 
exposure to reinsurance counterparty risk. Ongoing regulation definitely plays an important role in 
clarifying this issue through development of proper risk measures to establish capital ratios – if 
possible on the reinsurance level – and elucidation of reinsurance company responsibilities.  
 
 
Nosce te ipsum (Know thyself) 
Socrates 
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Tables and Figures 
Reinsurance Company 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
MunichRe 14.90% 14.80% 13.80% 15.80% 16.80% 16.80% 17.90% 
SwissRe 12.70% 14.40% 12.90% 13.70% 15.30% 14.10% 12.20% 
BerkshireHathawayRe 6.10% 5.90% 6.10% 6.70% 9.60% 5.90% 7.30% 
HannoverRe 5.20% 5.70% 5.60% 5.40% 5.90% 7.00% 6.60% 
GEInsuranceSolutions5 5.00% 4.60% 4.10% 
    
Lloyd's 4.00% 3.60% 4.00% 4.90% 4.60% 3.90% 5.20% 
Table 1: Market shares of the 5 biggest reinsurers from 2003 to 2007. 
Source: Standard and Poor's. 
 
Pays 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Belgium 12% 13% 14% 14% 15% 14% 15% 
France 10% 14% 11% 12% 12% 12% 13% 
Germany 21% 21% 22% 20% 19% 20% 18% 
Italy 14% 12% 12% 13% 13% 13% 10% 
Netherlands 15% 15% 16% 15% 12% 10% 11% 
Royaume-Uni 34% 33% 32% 29% 29% 29% 25% 
Table 2: Evolution of the part of reinsurance recoverables in the insurance company balance sheets. 
 
Level Techniques 
Monitor reinsurance coverage 
Diversification of reinsurance companies 
Management of self-retention level 
Collateral 
Diversify catastrophe coverage Catastrophe Bonds 
Directly cover default risk CDS for reinsurers with highest level of coverage 
CDO of reinsurance recoverables 
Table 3: Risk management techniques to monitor reinsurance counterparty risk 
 
Level Mean Description Pros/Cons Where 
Insurers SCR Internalization of Risk 
May arise interest in risk knowledge 
EU May limit it to the SCR calculation 
Formula not always adapted 
Reinsurers Solvability Standards 
No need to regulate a business sector 
EU 
Risk of false security to cedant 
Contracts Clauses 
State Licence 
No need to verify soundness of RI but costlier 
and less quantity restriction 
US If not, collateral obligations or 
Letter of Crédit 
Table 4: Level of regulation for reinsurer counterparty risk 
                                                          
5
 GE Insurance Solutions has been acquired in 2006 by Swiss Re. 
 Figure 1: Reinsurer downgrades from 2002 to the _rst semester of 2011. 
Source: Bloomberg, Brett and Singh (2005). 
 
 
Figure 2: Sources of reinsurer defaults. 
Source: Swiss Re (2003). 
 
 Figure 3: Main assessment methodologies of the reinsurer counterparty risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
